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INTRODUCTION
Recent total government budget deficits, now running at about 3.4 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), have managed to partially rescue the U.S. economy from the full consequences of its
long, debt-driven boom. But if we are to avoid a steep recession, much more will be needed.
The long economic expansion, dating from 1992 to 2000, was fueled by an unprecedented rise
in private expenditure relative to income, financed by a growing flow of net credit to the private
(household and business) sector.1 The ensuing boom was therefore attended by an unprecedented
rise in the private sector’s debt relative to its income.On the surface,it seemed as if the growing bur-
den of the household sector’s debt was counterbalanced by a spectacular rise in the relative value of
its financial assets, but this was never a match between equals. On one side was a debt commitment
that had to be met by actual flows of interest and repayments; on the other was a potential valuation
compounded out of earnings, expectations, and illusions. It always seemed sensible to us that the
two sides of this balance were fundamentally unequal (see, for example, Godley and Izurieta 2002,
p. 8; Godley 1999, p. 6).2 We have consistently maintained, in the face of some skepticism, that such
a process was unsustainable, that it would unravel, and that we were headed for a period of stagna-
tion that could be offset only by a sufficiently forceful fiscal stimulus.
The great meltdown in the financial markets has proved us right. The private sector has dra-
matically cut back its acquisition of new credit and reversed the path of its financial balance. The
most recently available figures indicate that its financial deficit moved from a high of 6.9 percent of
disposable income in the third quarter of 2000 to 1.6 percent in the second quarter of 2002 (having
dropped to 1 percent in the first quarter).However,this adjustment has been uneven within the pri-
vate sector. The business sector, as exemplified by the corporate sector, suffered a huge drop in
investment.Hence,it essentially stopped acquiring new debt even though interest rates reached their2 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
lowest levels since the early 1960s.3 On the other hand, the
household sector has continued to borrow, but even here, the
overall trend of rates of net credit flows and financial balances
seems to have leveled off since 2000.
With the private sector no longer willing—indeed, no
longer able—to expand its net credit flows,the very stimulus
that fueled the long boom has petered out.No counterweight
can be sought in the foreign current account, which has long
been in deficit and which even worsened sharply in 2002,
reaching an unprecedented 4.7 percent of GDP in the second
quarter. Preliminary data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) for July and August indicate that the trade
deficit has deteriorated even further since then (BEA 2002b);
we project a third-quarter 2002 current account deficit of
4.8 percent of GDP. We are left with the government sector
and, possibly, the net export demand portion of the foreign
sector.
During the long boom, the general government deficit
declined steadily, eventually giving way between 1998 and
2000 to the first set of postwar structural budget surpluses.
Until quite recently, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projected increasing budget surpluses well into the future
(CBO 2002a). We previously argued that if the government
were to maintain such a restrictive fiscal stance as the private
sector deficit inevitably began to return toward sustainable
levels, a severe recession would follow.4 Conversely, we argued
that in circumstances such as this, it was incumbent on the
government to do its part to keep the economy from entering
such a recession. With the growth rate of private expenditure
declining and a surge in exports unlikely, a sharp rise in gov-
ernment expenditure would be the only means left to sustain
adequate growth in aggregate demand.5
Indeed, this is what happened. Relative to GDP, the public
sector balance declined sharply, from a surplus of 1.2 percent
in the third quarter of 2000, at the peak of the expansion, to a
deficit of 3.4 percent in the second quarter of 2002, a shift
exceeding 4.5 percent of GDP in less than two years.We believe
that this is a step in the right direction,and that it has served to
stave off a much more severe recession. Clearly, however, more
is needed. The public sector must move more aggressively in 
an expansionary direction. If net export demand could be
improved,say,by a devaluation of the U.S.dollar,the size of the
government deficit required to do the job would be corre-
spondingly lower.6 In the following analysis, we explore the
possible combinations of these two deficits that would serve to
maintain the necessary levels of growth and employment.
RECENT PATTERNS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
We begin by examining the recent patterns of the three main
sectoral balances that compose the U.S. economy. As a matter
of accounting, the ex-post government sector deficit, the cur-
rent account surplus, and the private sector deficit (the excess
of consumption and investment over private sector disposable
income) must all add up to zero.
But ex ante, it is the excess of the sum of all demand injec-
tions less the leakages that drives growth (Papadimitriou and
Chart 1
Balances of the Main Sectors 
in Historical Perspective
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Wray 1998). Here, from 1992 to 2000 the injections from the
government deficit declined,eventually turning into leakages as
the government balance went to surplus in 1998. During the
same period, the current account was in deficit; this particular
leakage continued to escalate, reaching unprecedented levels.
The result was a rise in private expenditure relative to income—
with an attendant rise in the private sector deficit and debt bur-
den—as the major expansionary force. As long as the stock
market boom offset personal sector debt, the process seemed
endless. But, as noted earlier, this was an illusion; debt requires
actual principal and interest repayments, which cannot be
funded to any significant degree out of paper gains without
causing the markets to decline and the gains to evaporate.In any
case, the bubble burst at the end of 2000. In response, the pri-
vate sector moved swiftly to curtail its expenditures and simul-
taneously reduce its net borrowing.Chart 1 traces these patterns
in the three complementary balances.7
Chart 2 breaks down the private sector balance in Chart 1
into personal and corporate components (as percentages of
GDP), each in terms of three-quarter moving averages.
Although the corporate sector has rapidly returned to balance,
the personal sector has merely stabilized its balance at a level
that represents an ongoing deficit. This negative balance is far
below the surplus maintained by the personal sector during
most of the postwar period.8
The upshot of the spending boom is that personal sector
debt burdens remain extraordinarily high (Chart 3). None-
theless, the personal sector continues to borrow at a relatively
high rate, although the trend seems to have stabilized (Chart
4).We have argued that such a process is unsustainable.Indeed,
the most recent figures for household borrowing show that it
dropped sharply in August 2002, posting its smallest gain in
eight months. Wall Street analysts, who have generally been
bullish in the past,are now concerned that this borrowing slow-
down raises “worries about consumer spending ahead” (New
York Times,“Growing in Borrowing Slowed in August,”October
8, 2002).
Chart 5 tracks the net wealth of the household sector,
which is the balance between the stocks of its debt and its
assets, relative to personal disposable income. Note the sharp
drop in this measure starting in 1999, as the stock market
began its downward spiral. This drop has been so steep that
relative household net wealth has moved a considerable dis-
tance back toward its historical average.
Chart 4
Personal Sector Financial Balance 
and Net Flow of Credit
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Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’ calculations
Chart 5
Households’ Net Worth Relative to 
Personal Disposable Income
Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’ calculations


































It is interesting to note that two major components of the
assets of the personal sector have so far moved in quite different
ways. Although the value of the sector’s equity holdings has
declined sharply relative to its disposable income, the value of
its real estate assets has continued to rise (Chart 6). That these
two divergent effects are largely due to price effects is made clear
in Chart 7, which depicts the relative prices of equities and
housing. Finally, interest rates on household debt have fallen in
line with the federal (fed) funds rate, which is itself at a historic
low of 1.25 percent.All of this suggests that the full force of the
personal sector’s fall in net wealth has not yet been felt.
Observers have recently expressed concern about the overheat-
ing housing market and record-level real estate prices (The
Economist, October 12, 2002, pp. 12–13). Should these prices
begin to stagnate,or even to fall,it would have a significant neg-
ative impact on the borrowing capacity of households. Given
the current low level of the fed funds rate,not much more room
is left for monetary policy to counteract such an event.
It has long been our contention that such events were
inevitable and would lead to a sharp slowdown in GDP
growth unless they were sufficiently offset by demand injec-
tions elsewhere.While,others,too,have warned that the stock
market boom of the 1990s reflected a departure from funda-
mentals,9 our focus throughout has been on the need to take
the next step in the analysis: linking the potential deflation of
financial markets to the ensuing fragility of the economy’s
debt structure.It was the buildup of this debt that fueled both
the growth in real output and the stock market boom of the
1990s. It was this same debt buildup that eventually pushed
the economy into a state of “financial fragility,”as analyzed in
the work of Levy Institute Distinguished Scholar Hyman P.
Minsky.10 As our research has warned, the ensuing reaction
over the last several years has unraveled both the stock market
boom and real growth (Godley and Kregel 1998, Godley
1999). We have also consistently argued that in the face of a
high and growing current account deficit,growth in aggregate
demand could be sustained only by expansionary fiscal policy
(Godley 2000).
The annualized trend of GDP growth,depicted here as the
percentage change between a given quarter and its counterpart
four quarters (one year) earlier, began to decline between the
third quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2001 (Chart 8).
This decline corresponds to a sharp deterioration in the private
sector balance during this same period (Chart 1).Beginning in
the second quarter of 2001, growth recovered to some degree,
though it remained far below its potential.11 Why is even this
partial recovery evident? In our view, it occurred largely
because fiscal policy came to the rescue as the budget balance
reversed itself,moving dramatically from a small surplus in the
first quarter of 2000 to a substantial deficit of 3.4 percent of
GDP by the second quarter of 2002 (Chart 1).12
The reappearance of public sector deficits, which we have
long predicted, is all the more striking given that the CBO has
long projected just the opposite. Chart 9 depicts historical fig-
ures up to 2001, as well as CBO projections of the fiscal bal-
ance for 2002 onward, made at successive dates from October
2000 to the most recent, in August 2002 (CBO 2000; 2001a,b;
Chart 6
Components of Personal Sector Assets
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2002a,b). We discuss this in greater detail in the next section;
for now it is sufficient to note that in arriving at these projec-
tions, the CBO makes specific assumptions (as opposed to
forecasts) about key macroeconomic variables such as real
GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment. In addition, the
CBO projects only the federal deficit (so that a negative value
is a surplus),whereas we depict the general government deficit
implied by the federal deficit.13   It is striking that the CBO’s
projected deficits all display similar paths after 2002, moving
steadily toward ever-larger surpluses. Over time, however, the
slowdown in actual growth (whose severity was mitigated by
the massive relaxation of fiscal policy after 2000) has forced
the CBO to revise each successive estimate downward. Unless
a sharper increase occurs in the public sector deficit, more
such revisions will occur in the future. We have consistently
argued that the CBO’s projections were not plausible because
they implied an unsustainable increase in the private sector
deficit that would perforce be financed by further injections of
credit,thereby increasing the private sector’s debt burden.The
limits of that process have now become evident, and over the
last 17 months the CBO has had to revise its projections for
2002–06 downward by approximately $500 billion per year.
As noted earlier,no relief can be expected from net export
demand, since the current account portion of the balance of
payments not only remains stubbornly in deficit,but has dete-
riorated sharply over the first two quarters of 2002, arriving at
a new record of 4.7 percent of GDP.Past Levy Institute reports
have shown that the decline in the balance of trade in manu-
factures accounts for the greater share of this pattern. It is evi-
dent that this is an unsustainable process because it implies a
growing external debt burden that also must ultimately reach
its limits. Chart 10 depicts the recent history of the current
account balance, which is clearly driven by the primary bal-
ance. The recent modest reversal in the appreciation of the
dollar evidently had little effect and was unable to prevent net
property income abroad from falling considerably and even
turning negative. This is to be expected, since a rising foreign
debt burden should, ceteris paribus, imply a continuing shift
in interest and dividend payments in favor of foreigners
(Godley and Izurieta 2002, pp. 5–6).
Finally, it is worth noting that in recent times the public
and foreign sectors have once more become reflections of
each other (see Chart 1 for the period since mid 2001). In
effect the economy is again approaching a period of “twin”
Chart 9
Federal Fiscal Deficit as Projected by the CBO
Sources: CBO (various documents)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Chart 8
Growth of Real GDP (annual basis)
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Sources: NIPA and authors’ calculations
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deficits comparable to those of the 1980s and 1990s.14 We
also anticipated this development, in a series of reports
beginning in early 2001 (e.g., Godley and Izurieta 2001,
2002). Indeed, we have argued that the alternative to expand-
ing the public deficit was a prolonged recession, and it was
our belief that such an outcome would not have been politi-
cally feasible. Current events seem to have borne this out.
AVOIDING A “HARD LANDING”: 
SOME POLICY SCENARIOS
As a matter of accounting, the ex-post government sector
deficit, current account surplus, and private sector deficit
(private sector disposable income less consumption and
investment) must add up to zero. Given the complementary
nature of the three main balances, the paths of any two will
imply the ex-post path of the third. We can make use of this
property first to discern what is likely to happen in the econ-
omy if the CBO’s assumptions underlying its projections of
future budget balances are to be realized.This is our baseline
scenario, which tracks what the private sector must do in
order to attain the CBO’s projected growth path. We will
then reverse the procedure and try to ascertain what the gov-
ernment deficit is likely to be if the private sector chooses a
more plausible adjustment path. Finally, we will examine
various alternative scenarios that could achieve the CBO’s
growth path via a combination of fiscal policy and signifi-
cant improvement in net export demand.
The Baseline Scenario: Sectoral Balances 
Implied by CBO Assumptions
The first step is to construct what we call the baseline scenario.
The aim here is to show what the private sector and foreign
sector balances must be within our model if the CBO’s pro-
jected fiscal balances,growth rates,and inflation rates are to be
realized. The latest CBO projections (2002b) for the govern-
ment deficit are shown in Chart 9. In addition to these, the
CBO assumes that GDP will grow at 2.3 percent in 2002, 3
percent in 2003, and 3.2 percent on average from 2004 until
2007; and that inflation, as represented by the rate of change
of the GDP deflator, will be 1.1 percent in 2002, 1.6 percent in
2003, and 2 percent on average from 2004 until 2007. To this
we add the provisional assumptions that the nominal dollar
exchange rate will remain constant and that world demand
growth will rise moderately from its current low level. Chart
11 depicts this baseline scenario. The dark line represents the
general government deficit corresponding to the CBO projec-
tion of the federal deficits, while the other two lines represent
the relative surpluses of the private and foreign sectors
implied by the CBO’s assumptions.15 Note that in the case of
the government sector, the deficit is depicted (so that a nega-
tive number represents a surplus), while for the private and
foreign sectors, their surplus is shown (so that a negative
number is a deficit).
The lower line in Chart 11 shows our conditional forecast
of the current account balance,as a percentage of GDP,through
2006.This brings us to our central point.If,as in the CBO’s lat-
est projection, the present government deficit were to be pared
to a surplus by 2006,the private sector would again have to run
increasing deficits to generate the GDP growth projected by the
CBO. This, in turn, would increase private indebtedness to new
heights. It is hard to believe that after the collapse of equity
prices, the private sector will return to a high and even rising
level of indebtedness. Yet if the fiscal stance projected by the
CBO were to be achieved, this is what must occur.
We therefore contend that a different policy is required.
In order to achieve growth sufficient to maintain unemploy-
ment at reasonable levels, there must be substantial injections
of new demand. This cannot come from the private sector, as
it has in the past, because this same past has left the private
sector with dangerously high levels of household and corpo-
rate debt. Hence it is the government sector that must assume
the bulk of the burden.
Chart 11
Balances of the Main Sectors 
Implied by CBO’s Assumptions
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Scenario 1: Implications of CBO Fiscal Policy in the
Face of a Projected Private Sector Balance by 2007
In the baseline scenario (Chart 11) we found that the private
sector would have to run large deficits if the CBO’s assump-
tions about growth were to be achieved in the face of its pro-
jections for the public sector fiscal stance (that is, for the tax
rate and the growth of government spending). We now con-
sider what would happen if instead the private sector contin-
ued on its present path and achieved eventual balance by 2007.
Given the same fiscal stance as before, we find that such a
result would imply a lower rate of real GDP growth over the
2002–06 period,averaging about 1 percent per year.This lower
growth rate, in turn, would imply lower tax revenues, so the
government deficit would rise to almost 5 percent by 2006 (a
figure within the range of the postwar average).16 Second,
given that the three sectoral balances must add up to zero, the
assumption that the private sector moves into balance implies
that the public sector and the foreign sector must move in
opposite directions. Thus the “twin”deficit in the foreign sec-
tor would also be around 5 percent,which is essentially its cur-
rent level (see Chart 1). This is Scenario 1, depicted in Chart
12. But this scenario also implies a rise in unemployment, to
around 7 percent by 2005 and 8 percent by 2006, which seems
to us to be both undesirable and unsupportable.
Scenario 2: Achieving CBO Growth via 
Budget Deficits
We might now turn the question around and ask, What fiscal
stance would be required to achieve the CBO’s projected
growth rates of real output? We retain the assumption that the
private sector will continue to move toward balance.Given the
high level of debt in the household sector, it is plausible that
this sector will continue to pare its borrowing and perhaps
even move toward net saving. On the other hand, the revival
of growth on which this scenario is predicated is likely to stim-
ulate further borrowing by the business sector to support its
expansion. It is therefore plausible that the two effects would
cancel each other out, so that growth of borrowing in the pri-
vate sector as a whole would remain flat. Under these condi-
tions, as depicted in Chart 13, we find that in order to achieve
the CBO’s growth targets,it would be necessary to have budget
deficits rise sharply, to a level of over 8 percent by 2006. Such
a level would be higher than the 4 to 5 percent postwar aver-
age, higher than the 6.5 percent level of the Reagan-Bush era,
and higher still than the previous peak of 7.5 percent in 1975.
Moreover, with the private sector moving into balance, the
current account deficit would have to be of roughly the same
order as the budget deficit. But the current account deficit
(about 5 percent) is already at record levels, and its further
deterioration to over 8 percent is surely unsustainable.
Chart 12
Alternative Scenario 1:
Implications of CBO’s Projected Fiscal Policy






























Fiscal Policy Required to Achieve CBO Growth
























Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’ calculations
Government Deficit
Personal Balance
Current Account Balance8 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Scenario 3 (The Dream Scenario): 
Sustainable Balances
If fiscal policy alone could not sustain growth and employ-
ment without unacceptable increases in both budget and cur-
rent account deficits, where else might we turn? The answer
lies in what we have previously called our dream scenario: an
improvement in net export demand sufficient to achieve CBO
projected growth and, hence, employment, without relatively
large budget deficits.
In all of our previous simulations we provisionally
assumed that the exchange rate remained unchanged and that
real exports grew at 1 percent per year. But we believe, as do
others (Bergsten 2002), that net export demand could be
raised substantially by means of a devaluation of the effective
exchange rate, of around 25 percent, at the beginning of 2003.
This would reverse the present trend of the current account,
bringing it close to a sustainable level of 2 to 2.5 percent of
GDP by 2006. With the private sector itself assumed to be
approaching balance, this would imply that the government
sector would also move toward balance. Thus all three sectors
could return to sustainable balances, while still achieving
desired levels of employment and growth.This felicitous com-
bination is described in Scenario 3, depicted in Chart 14.
We are aware that the policy scenario we propose is by no
means an easy one to achieve. With the advent of flexible
exchange rates, devaluations are no longer a standard policy
instrument. Since 1998, growing current account deficits
have not led to any substantial depreciation of the dollar,
other than a modest fall in the first half of 2002. Indeed, the
deficit has not even reacted in the usual manner to the latest
decline in U.S. growth (such as in the third quarter of 2002),
which should have slowed the growth of imports and hence
reduced the deficit. Instead, both the trade balance and the
current account deteriorated even further. We recognize that
devaluation on the order of 25 percent would raise import
prices and thus might stimulate a general price rise. But our
estimates indicate that this effect would be fairly modest, and
we draw confidence from the fact that a much larger depreci-
ation in the mid 1980s was not attended by a significant rise
in inflation.
However, the consequences for foreigners of a substantial
improvement in the U.S. current account balance are much
more serious. Other things being equal, such an improvement
would imply a decline in relative net export demand by the
rest of the world, with a corresponding decline in its levels of
output and employment.This,in turn,would inevitably affect
our own export growth and, as a result, our output and
employment growth. The only solution, therefore, is for our
trading partners to shoulder part of the burden of fueling
worldwide growth by undertaking their own expansionary
measures at the same time. The U.S. net trade deficit has long
provided a stimulus to its trading partners,but the record lev-
els of its current account deficit signal the approaching end of
that process. What therefore seems to be required is a coordi-
nated expansionary effort on an international scale, with a
greater share taken up by the rest of the developed world. The
alternative is a severe growth recession and a steep rise in
unemployment in the United States and, most likely, the rest
of the world.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic growth from 1992 to 2000 was largely fueled by a
spectacular rise in net lending to the private sector (Chart 4).
We have argued in the past that the borrowing frenzy and its
concomitant buildup of debt, which had fueled both the
growth in real output and the stock market boom of the
1990s, was pushing the economy into a Minskian state of
financial fragility. Others had also warned about the unsus-
tainability of the boom in the latter part of the 1990s, partic-
ularly with regard to the stock market.Our particular concern
Chart 14
Alternative Scenario 3: 
Fiscal Policy and Export Growth Required to
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has always been that the potential deflation of financial mar-
kets could also unravel real growth, which is precisely what
happened.The equally spectacular rise in the value of financial
assets that sustained private sector net worth melted away
(Charts 5–7), and the private (business and personal) sector
responded by cutting back its acquisition of further debt
(Chart 1). In the face of these events, the trend of the GDP
growth rate declined sharply from the third quarter of 2000 to
the second quarter of 2001 (Chart 8).
From the second quarter of 2001 forward,real GDP growth
made a partial recovery, although it reached only half the aver-
age rate achieved during the previous expansion. This partial
recovery,far too modest to sustain employment,took place only
because the small budget surplus in the first quarter of 2000
reversed itself dramatically, becoming a deficit of nearly 4 per-
cent of GDP (Chart 1).We had consistently advocated just such
a reversal in fiscal policy near the end of the 1992 debt-fueled
expansion. This reappearance of public sector deficits was evi-
dently a surprise to the CBO, which had steadfastly projected
substantial surpluses, only to successively revise these projec-
tions downward in light of actual events (Chart 9).Over the last
17 months the CBO has had to revise its projections for the
2002–06 period downward by $500 billion per year.
While the current fiscal policy has moved in the right
direction,we believe that it is far from sufficient.To substanti-
ate this conviction, we examine four alternative policy 
scenarios.
We call the first alternative our Baseline Scenario, which is
depicted in Chart 11. In this scenario we show that in order to
realize the CBO’s latest projected growth rates and fiscal bal-
ances within our model, the private sector would again have to
run increasing deficits and raise its indebtedness to new heights.
We have argued in the past (and argue more urgently now) that
since even current private sector debt burdens are unsustain-
able, the prospect of their further escalation is not feasible.
Consequently, we turn to Scenario 1, depicted in Chart
12. Here we retain the latest CBO assumptions about the gov-
ernment’s fiscal stance (tax rates and spending plans) and sup-
plement them with the assumption that the private sector will
continue on its present path toward decreasing deficits,culmi-
nating in eventual balance by 2007. We find that under these
circumstances, real GDP growth would average about 1 per-
cent over the 2002–07 period, with associated levels of unem-
ployment on the order of 7 to 8 percent. This, in turn, would
imply lower tax revenues, thereby raising the government
deficit to almost 5 percent of GDP by 2007 (which is within
the range of the postwar average) and keeping the current
account deficit at roughly its present level, about 5 percent.
This shows that the CBO’s assumptions about the fiscal stance
are not only incompatible with its assumptions about growth
and employment, but would result in undesirable economic
outcomes.
In Scenario 2 of Chart 13, we consider which fiscal stance
is required to achieve the CBO’s assumptions on growth,
retaining the assumption that the private sector will continue
to move toward balance.This leads us to conclude that achiev-
ing the CBO’s growth targets would require sharply higher
budget deficits, on the order of 8 percent of GDP by 2007.
Assuming that the private sector moves toward balance, this
would require a correspondingly large “twin” deficit in the
current account balance. Both of these deficits would be sig-
nificantly higher than the present and postwar averages, and
even higher than past postwar peaks. We conclude that sus-
taining growth and employment through fiscal policy alone is
simply not feasible.
Finally, we turn to Scenario 3 (Chart 14), which we call
our dream scenario. In it we allow for the possibility of sub-
stantial improvement in net export demand resulting from a
devaluation of the dollar of about 25 percent. This would
require a much smaller initial budget deficit in order to real-
ize the levels of real GDP growth assumed by the CBO.
Indeed, over time the resulting GDP growth would reverse
the directions of both the public sector and current account
deficits, so that both, along with the private sector, would
approach sustainable levels by 2007. Thus the combined
effects of a devaluation and an expansionary fiscal policy
could achieve desired levels of employment and growth while
also restoring each sector to a better balance. Given the pres-
ent high levels of sectoral debt burdens, this latter possibility
is of great significance.
We recognize that the fiscal and trade policies we propose
are by no means easily implemented, particularly in light of
their probable global repercussions. We also realize that fiscal
conservatives may react disapprovingly to the reappearance of
the “twin” deficits that seem inevitable to us in the short run.
But we believe that the alternative—a severe recession with a
significant rise in unemployment—is surely unacceptable to
all concerned.10 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
NOTES
1. The private sector consists of the household and business sec-
tors. The latter, in turn, is made up of the noncorporate and
nonprofit enterprises and the corporate sector.
2. It is remarkable how often analysts tend to forget that debts have
to be paid, whereas the capital gains that appear to offset them
cannot be realized in any significant amount by the private sec-
tor as a whole without causing the markets to crash and gains to
disappear.
3. The latest round of interest rate cuts has reduced the federal
funds rate to 1.25 percent and the discount rate to 0.75 percent.
The limits of monetary policy are now widely acknowledged.
4. A severe recession would be tantamount to a “debt crisis”in the
sense of Minsky (1982, 1986).
5. The consensus in the last decade has been that the U.S. expan-
sion was solid because it was grounded in supply-side factors
such as the technological dynamism of the economy and flexi-
bility in the labor market. From this point of view, government
intervention is neither necessary nor desirable,because the mar-
ket is always self-righting. Against this consensus, the Levy
Institute has long recommended a recourse to fiscal policy when
appropriate (Papadimitriou and Wray 1998; Godley 1999;
Godley and Izurieta 2001, 2002).
6. As a matter of accounting, if the private sector is in balance, the
government deficit must equal the foreign deficit.
7. In this chart, a negative government balance represents a sur-
plus. The other balances are more intuitive, in the sense that
positive numbers imply surpluses.
8. Using quarterly data for the period of the recent expansion (the
second quarter of 1992 through the third quarter of 2000), the
personal sector balance declined steadily,from an initial surplus
of 4.5 percent of GDP to a significant deficit of 1.7 percent. The
balance continued to fall somewhat erratically during the first
two quarters of 2001, then underwent a swift upturn during the
third quarter,due to the positive impact of the tax rebate on dis-
posable income. It fell once again in the last quarter of 2001, as
households spent previous windfall gains and were encouraged
by zero-percent interest rates on the purchase of durable goods.
9. Many analysts have come to adopt Robert Shiller’s (2000) view
that the stock market boom of the late 1990s was driven by
“irrational exuberance.”
10. The classic references are Minsky (1982, 1986). For a concise
summary, see Minsky (1991, especially footnote 51).
11. The most recent preliminary estimates for the third quarter of
2002 show real GDP growth of 4.0 percent at an annualized, sea-
sonally adjusted rate (1.3 percent growth in the preceding quar-
ter). Such estimates are typically subject to considerable revision.
More important,because the apparent growth surge has been led
almost exclusively by the growth in personal consumption expen-
ditures, most commentators now agree with our opinion that
such a growth rate is unsustainable in the face of record levels of
household debt (Financial Times, “US Economy Still Troubled
Despite Bright Spots,”October 31, 2002).
12. The BEA (2002a) states that “both the previously published and
the revised estimates show GDP growth peaking in the fourth
quarter of 1999 and slowing substantially during the quarters of
2000. However, the revised estimates show declines in GDP for
each of the first three quarters of 2001, whereas the previously
published estimates showed positive but decelerating growth in
the first half of 2001 and a decline in the third quarter.Both sets
of estimates show GDP growth resuming in the fourth quarter
of 2001.”
13. To derive the general government deficit from the federal deficit,
we adapted the CBO’s projection using a scaling factor derived
from the past (fairly stable) relationship between the federal
budget and the surplus or deficit in the general government.
14. For details, see Godley (1995).
15. We scale up the federal budget balance to obtain the implicit
general government balance using historical patterns between
the two.
16. In addition,a small increase in government expenditure arises in
Scenario 1, due to the higher projected level of unemployment.
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